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ABSTRACT
Background Catastrophic errors in healthcare
are rare, yet the consequences are so serious that
where possible, special procedures are put in
place to prevent them. As systems become safer,
it becomes progressively more difficult to detect
the remaining vulnerabilities. Using inadvertent
intrathecal administration of vinca alkaloids as an
example, we investigated whether analysis of
incident report data describing low-harm events
could bridge this gap.
Methods We studied nine million patient safety
incidents reported from England and Wales
between November 2003 and May 2013. We
searched for reports relating to administration of
vinca alkaloids in patients also receiving
intrathecal medication, and classified the failures
identified against steps in the relevant national
protocol.
Results Of 38 reports that met our inclusion
criteria, none resulted in actual harm. The stage
of the medication process most commonly
involved was ‘supply, transport and storage’ (15
cases). Seven cases related to dispensing, six to
documentation, and four each to prescribing and
administration. Defences most commonly
breached related to separation of intravenous
vinca alkaloids and intrathecal medication in
timing (n=16) and location (n=8); potential for
confusion due to inadequate separation of these
drugs therefore remains. Problems involved in six
cases did not align with the procedural defences
in place, some of which represented major
hazards.
Conclusions We identified areas of concern
even within the context of a highly controlled
standardised national process. If incident
reporting systems include and encourage reports
of no-harm incidents in addition to actual patient
harm, they can facilitate monitoring the resilience
of healthcare processes. Patient safety incidents
that produce the most serious harm are often
rare, and it is difficult to know whether patients
are adequately protected. Our approach provides
a potential solution.
INTRODUCTION
The first reports of deaths from the
administration of intravenous vincristine
via the incorrect route started to appear
in the medical literature in the late
1960s.1 Despite an awareness of the pro-
blems associated with vincristine and
other vinca alkaloids for over 45 years,
serious and sometimes fatal errors asso-
ciated with their use still occur.2 3 Such
events remain very rare but have devastat-
ing and tragic consequences for the
people concerned (often children) and
their families.
Investigations of such incidents have
shown them to be classic systems failures
and thus amenable to prevention.4 5
Analyses have found vulnerabilities at
every stage of the process, including inad-
equate labelling, ambiguous procedures,
lack of standardisation across units and
other hazards. Newer, unexpected failures
at the manufacturing stage have also been
reported.6 In the absence of a long
sought-after failsafe involving a new
spinal injection connecting system,7 the
safety of patients receiving intravenous
vinca alkaloids as part of cytotoxic
chemotherapy continues to depend on
compliance with guidelines and protocols.
The challenge of eliminating these
tragic events has inspired policy state-
ments from, among others, the North
American Institute of Safe Medication
Practices, the UK Government, the
Australian Council for Safety and Quality
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in Health Care, the Ministry of Health in Hong Kong
and WHO.8–11 In the UK12 and other countries,5 10
guidance and protocols have been issued that specify
the exact processes required for the administration of
intravenous vincristine (and other vinca alkaloids) in
patients who are also receiving intrathecal chemother-
apy. These policy statements and resulting changes in
procedure have done much to reduce the risks of the
maladministration of vinca alkaloids. However, given
that the adverse outcome is so rare, there is no easy
way of identifying any remaining vulnerabilities, or
monitoring the current risk to patients.
In the UK, to the best of our knowledge, there have
been no deaths or serious incidents since 2001.1 The
very success of current policies and procedures makes
the identification of any remaining vulnerabilities
much more challenging. In Amalberti’s telling phrase,
it is one of the ‘paradoxes of ultra-safe systems’13; the
safer a system becomes, the less safety information is
available to monitor current safety or to guide future
safety interventions. The deaths from vincristine,
while dreadful, led to an opportunity to learn and
improve. The challenge is now to monitor and further
improve safety in the absence of evidence of harm.
In this study, we use the National Reporting and
Learning System (NRLS), a uniquely large database of
patient safety incidents from England and Wales, to
examine current hazards associated with the adminis-
tration of vinca alkaloids. NRLS data have previously
been used to identify other high-risk, low-frequency,
events.14–20 Our objectives were to: (1) identify and
analyse reports relating to administration of intra-
thecal medication in patients also prescribed intraven-
ous vinca alkaloids; (2) identify the defences breached
and (3) consider the implications for the current and
future safety of the systems and processes involved.
We also consider the wider usefulness and potential of
using very large databases of reported incidents to
study rare but potentially serious patient safety events.
METHODS
Context
Our analysis was conducted in 2013. At this time,
national guidance was in place across England and
Wales requiring hospitals to instigate a series of actions
relating to the safe intrathecal administration of chemo-
therapy, and to prevent the administration of vinca alka-
loids intended for intravenous administration via the
incorrect route. Specifically, Department of Health
guidance was initially issued in November 200121 to
support a national target to reduce to zero the number
of patients dying or being paralysed by maladministered
spinal injections by the end of 2001.22 The aim was to
ensure uniform practice across England and Wales so
that staff moving from one hospital to another would
not have to adapt to a different procedure. This guid-
ance was then updated and reissued in October 200323;
all English National Health Service (NHS) hospitals
providing an intrathecal chemotherapy service were
peer reviewed between November 2004 and 2007 to
ensure compliance against this guidance. In August
2008, the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) issued
a Rapid Response Report additionally recommending
the use of 50 mL minibags to dilute vinca alkaloids
administered in adult and adolescent units, with an
implementation deadline in February 2009.24 The
Department of Health guidance was then updated in
2008 to take into account NPSA guidance and add-
itional risks highlighted by the peer review process, with
an implementation date of the end of December
2008.25 Key elements of current guidance are sum-
marised in figure 1.
Data source
The study population was derived from the database
of approximately nine million reports of patient safety
incidents reported from the NHS in England and
Wales over the last decade. Since 2002, NHS organi-
sations and their staff have been encouraged to report
to the NRLS any occurrence of harm or potential
harm to a patient as a ‘patient safety incident’,
defined as ‘any unintended or unexpected incident
which could have, or did, lead to harm for one or
more patients receiving NHS care.’26 Prior to March
2012, reports to the NRLS were received, evaluated
and acted upon by the NPSA, an independent body at
arm’s length from the headquarters of the NHS.18
Following abolition of the NPSA in 2010,27 the tasks
of evaluating incident reports and issuing alerts to the
NHS transferred to NHS England, the body respon-
sible for managing the English NHS.
Each incident report includes structured information
in a number of categories: demographic and adminis-
trative; the circumstances of occurrence; a categorisa-
tion of causation; an assessment of the degree of actual
harm (‘no’, ‘low’, ‘moderate’, ‘severe’, ‘death’); and
action taken, or planned, to investigate or prevent a
recurrence. Additionally, a section of the report allows
the staff member making the report to state in free text
narrative fashion what happened and why they think it
happened. Data are anonymised to remove details that
identify any patients or staff. A full description of the
NRLS database can be found elsewhere.20 27
Reports extracted from the patient safety database
We searched the free text incident description field of
incidents reported over the period 1 November
2003–16 May 2013 for those which included any of
the following terms: vincristine, vinca, Oncovin, vin-
desine, vinflunine, vinorelbine or vinblastine. The
output from this search was then subject to a further
free text search using the terms ‘intrathecal’ and
‘spinal’. We then read each report retrieved to identify
those that met our inclusion criterion of incidents that
related to the use of intravenous vinca alkaloids in
patients also prescribed intrathecal medication.
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Analysis
We identified the degree of harm reported, and the
year in which the incident occurred. We then identi-
fied the principal stage of the medication use process
in which the patient safety incident occurred, accord-
ing to the following schema:
▸ prescribing
▸ dispensing (preparation and labelling of the medication
in the pharmacy)
▸ supply, transport and storage (including release of medi-
cation from the pharmacy)
▸ administration of medication to the patient
▸ documentation (including documentation of medication
administration and the associated audit trail).
Finally, we identified from the free text descriptions,
the principal defence(s) according to figure 1 that had
been breached for each incident.
Coding was carried out independently by two
researchers (BDF and SP), and any discrepancies
resolved by discussion.
RESULTS
Overview of incident reports
Our search strategy initially revealed 44 reports. Of
these 44, six concerned patient safety incidents that
involved other drugs or procedures and, therefore,
did not meet our inclusion criteria. For example, one
Figure 1 Summary of defences to prevent errors in the administration of intrathecal chemotherapy, based on Department of Health
guidance on the safe administration of intrathecal chemotherapy.25 IT, intrathecal; IV, intravenous.
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concerned the omission of pegylated aspariginase in a
patient who was also receiving doxorubicin and vin-
cristine as part of their chemotherapy protocol;
another concerned the omission of folinate in a
patient-prescribed vincristine and cyclophosphamide.
These six cases were therefore excluded from further
analysis, leaving 38 remaining reports. Examples of
two of these are presented in box 1.
A further two of the 38 reports concerned intra-
thecal antibiotics (rather than intrathecal chemother-
apy) being given on the same day and/or being stored
in the same location as intravenous vinca alkaloids.
While not covered by the Department of Health guid-
ance,25 these were felt by staff at the organisation con-
cerned to represent a similar risk. We thus included
these incidents in our initial results but excluded them
from our analyses according to the stage of medica-
tion use in which the patient safety incident occurred
and the defences breached.
All incidents occurred in 2005 or later, with peaks
in 2006/2007 (six incidents) and in 2010/2011 (eight
incidents). With such small numbers it was not pos-
sible to conduct formal analysis of any trends in
reported incidents over time, but there was no dis-
cernible trend since 2005.
Impact of incidents on patients
Of the 38 included reports, 33 were classified by the
reporter as resulting in ‘no harm’, and five as ‘low
harm’. However, on closer inspection of the descrip-
tions provided, there was no evidence of any actual
harm in the five ‘low harm’ cases. None of the inci-
dents, therefore, appeared to have caused any actual
patient harm.
Stage of medication use process
We excluded the two reports concerning intrathecal
antibiotics, plus a further incident for which the
description had insufficient detail to determine the
stage involved. In one of the remaining 35 cases, two
stages were involved (box 1). Overall, the stage of the
medication use process most commonly involved was
‘supply, transport and storage’ (15 cases). Seven cases
related to dispensing, six to documentation and four
each to prescribing and medication administration.
Defences breached
After excluding the two antibiotic-related reports and
the report for which the description was insufficient,
the most common categories of defence breached
were those that related to separation of intravenous
vinca alkaloids and intrathecal medication in terms of
timing (n=16) and location (n=8). Table 1 presents in
more detail the specific defences involved. The princi-
pal remaining risk appears to be the potential for
inadequate separation of intrathecal and intravenous
chemotherapy, whether in time (administration on the
same day) or location (storing or transporting them
together).
The six cases classified as ‘other’ involved those
where none of the defences in figure 1 seem to have
been breached specifically. These included: two pre-
scribing errors involving the prescription of ‘intra-
thecal vincristine’ which were identified and rectified;
a dose of intravenous vinca-based chemotherapy not
made for the day required; a patient documented on a
theatre list as requiring ‘intrathecal vincristine’ (rather
Box 1 Examples of cases analysed. Date of incident,
date of reporting, ward names and organisational
characteristics removed to preserve anonymity
Case 1: detailed description; two stages of the medica-
tion use process involved (‘supply, transport and storage’
and ‘documentation’)
CATEGORY: Medication
DEGREE OF HARM: No harm
AGE AT INCIDENT: (Not stated)
LOCATION: Inpatient areas
SPECIALTY: Medical specialties/medical oncology
INCIDENT DESCRIPTION: ‘(1) patient prescribed
RCHOP [regimen] chemotherapy by Oncology, and separ-
ately prescribed intrathecal methotrexate by
Haematology. Two separate requests were received in
pharmacy on different days without any communication
that the patient was to have both treatments on the
same day. Due to the volume of work and staff shortages
within the lab, the two requests were not tied together.
Consequently the IV chemotherapy was released to
[oncology ward] and the intrathecal chemotherapy to
[haematology day unit] by different pharmacists at differ-
ent times without either being aware that the two separ-
ate requests existed. This meant that vincristine for this
patient was on the ward while the intrathecal was in pro-
gress and without confirmation that IV chemotherapy
has been given first as per the National Guidance. In the
event, the chemotherapy was not given and was returned
to pharmacy which was when the incident came to light.
(2) during the course of the morning the original addres-
sograph was changed (ie surname / Christian name
changed round), after pharmacy had labelled the intra-
thecal methotrexate, which was then returned to be
relabelled’.
Case 2: minimal detail available; stage of medication use
process involved ‘supply, transport and storage’
CATEGORY: Medication
DEGREE OF HARM: No harm
AGE AT INCIDENT: (Not stated)
LOCATION: Inpatient areas
SPECIALTY: Medical specialties/clinical haematology
INCIDENT DESCRIPTION: ‘Syringe of vincristine (a dose
banded syringe) found in the cytotoxic fridge on the day
that the patient was given intrathecal chemotherapy’.
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than intrathecal methotrexate as intended); a missing
syringe of intravenous vincristine; and a patient who
had the incorrect cannula inserted for the dose of
intravenous vincristine required.
The two independent coders initially disagreed on
only two occasions: (1) whether or not one of the
initial 44 reports retrieved met our inclusion criteria;
(2) regarding the stage of the medication use process
involved for one of our 38 included incidents. Both
were resolved following discussion.
DISCUSSION
Key findings
We identified 38 patient safety incidents relating to
vinca alkaloids and intrathecal medication that had
been reported to a national patient safety database
over a 10-year period. The stage of the medication
use process most commonly involved was ‘supply,
transport and storage’, and the defences most com-
monly breached were those relating to separating
intravenous and intrathecal chemotherapy in time and
location. None of the reports included any evidence
of actual patient harm. There was no clear pattern of
incident reporting over time; the absence of reports
pre-2005 is likely to reflect the fact that the NRLS
was still in development and not yet fully established
as a national presence.20 28
Interpretation
Inadvertent intrathecal administration of vinca
alkaloids intended for intravenous use is now a very
rare event. The NRLS has revealed no reports of harm
since 2003. However, the rarity of this event should
not be a reason for complacency; first, because further
cases occurred internationally in 2011,2 3 and second,
because continuing safety requires ongoing vigilance
and ongoing assessment of current and future risks. In
healthcare, our understanding of safety has tradition-
ally relied on the analysis of serious and harmful inci-
dents; however, where systems have become much
safer we need to take a more proactive approach and
assess more subtle signs of system vulnerability.29
The present study, together with the changing
healthcare landscape, suggests a number of areas that
should be reviewed. First, our study suggests that
there is still potential for confusion due to inadequate
separation of intravenous and intrathecal drugs. This
is particularly worrying because the failure to separate
these drugs has played a major role in previous traged-
ies30 and because the separation of drugs upstream in
the process is likely to be a more reliable defence than
checks by staff at a later stage. Second, more complex
drug regimes are constantly emerging which may pose
new challenges. For instance, some chemotherapy
regimens require chemotherapy to be given on two
consecutive days, but intrathecal chemotherapy only
given on the first day. This may lead to improvised
local rules as the national guidance is based around
the intravenous medication being given first. Any
ambiguity in such processes puts patients at risk.
Third, these findings suggest more general lessons for
the administration of other intrathecal drugs. For
instance, there is considerable potential for maladmin-
istration of medication in patients prescribed concomi-
tant intrathecal antibiotics and intravenous
medication, but guidelines are less stringent or not in
place at all. Guidance may also be more difficult to
implement as intrathecal antibiotics may be given in
parallel with a very wide range of other drugs, as well
as with intravenous chemotherapy. A solution based
on redesign is still needed, as pointed out by Berwick
some 12 years ago.31
Of particular concern was our finding that the
problems involved in six cases did not align with the
procedural defences at all, and at least some repre-
sented major hazards. It may seem absurd to think
that a patient listed for theatre as requiring ‘intrathecal
vincristine’ would actually receive the drug via this
fatal route. Yet it has previously proved a folly to
believe that common sense or technical knowledge
would act as a failsafe. Perhaps, there is even more
Table 1 Incidents presented according to the main defence (as
in figure 1) breached
Defence
Number of
reports
Administration only in designated centres 0
Only those on local register can prescribe, dispense, issue,
check or administer intrathecal (IT) chemotherapy
0
IT chemotherapy on separate prescription with
accompanying checklist and audit trail
1
Intravenous (IV) and IT chemotherapy separated in time 15
1. Administered at separate times—IV then IT 6
2. Signature to confirm all IV chemotherapy for that day
given, before IT released to the doctor who will
administer it
9
IV and IT chemotherapy separated in location 7
1. Separate storage in pharmacy and ward areas, with
IT doses in a dedicated locked fridge
5
2. Separate storage in pharmacy and ward areas, with
IT doses in a dedicated locked fridge
5
3. Separate transport of IT in distinctive container 1
4. Administration in separate clinical areas 1
IV and IT chemotherapy differentiated in appearance 6
1. IV vinca alkaloids for adults and adolescents
prepared in minibags, not syringes
1
2. Labelling of medication with route of administration
printed in bold ‘for intrathecal use only’ and ‘for
intravenous use only’
5
Under normal circumstances, administered during working
hours only
0
Administration checks 0
Other 6
TOTAL 35
Bold numbers represent main categories; italic numbers represent sub-
categories of these.
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danger if staff believe they are insulated from error
because they have correctly implemented and fol-
lowed recommended procedures.
Of note, none of the incidents analysed referred to
electronic prescribing (EP), and yet chemotherapy EP
systems are now used in 34% of English hospitals.32 It
may be that intrathecal medication is not yet being
prescribed electronically; local experience suggests
that some EP systems do not support the prescribing
and audit trail requirements, resulting in the potential
for intrathecal chemotherapy to be prescribed on
paper, and other chemotherapy to be prescribed elec-
tronically. Such split prescribing practices would
potentially pose new hazards.
Strengths and limitations
The NRLS is one of the few databases with the cap-
acity to identify rare events of the kind studied here.
Its size, duration and the inclusion of reports of low
levels of harm as well as adverse outcomes, are all
unique strengths. The main limitation is that there
may be considerable under-reporting of incidents con-
cerning vinca alkaloids, just as for other issues.20
Nevertheless, of all the errors in healthcare, the cata-
strophic nature of the maladministration of vincristine
has meant that it has featured as an example in policy
documents22 and training materials.34 NHS staff are
likely to have a high level of concern about any inci-
dents of this type, a phenomenon Reason has termed
‘chronic anxiety’.35 Our analysis is limited to what has
been reported on the system, in terms of accuracy and
the level of detail. The quality of the reports varies
widely (box 1), although this has not formally been
investigated.28 The sample of incidents is also valuable
as it provides information about vulnerabilities of the
system. It was beyond the scope of our study to iden-
tify the ways in which violations of procedures were
recognised and corrected, and the reports generally
included limited detail of the reporter’s interpretation
of the causes or the actions taken as a result.
Implications for practice
To be able to anticipate risks in the absence of harm is
the hallmark of a resilient system.33 It points to a
more proactive approach to safety in healthcare
which, in turn, relies on the integration and analysis
of diverse sources of safety information.29 The ori-
ginal report which provided the foundation for
patient safety in the UK NHS was called An
Organisation with a Memory, precisely because it
sought to provide a means of learning from incidents
across the entire system. Isolated tragedies occurred
constantly but, because no connections were made, no
collective action was taken. When systems become
safer, this challenge is even greater. How can we iden-
tify small threats to patients across a system as large as
the NHS? The true value of large-scale reporting
systems is not in the accumulation of vast numbers of
reports but in the identification of rare or unusual
events scattered across the wider system which might
otherwise escape notice and put patients at
risk.22 36 37 We would therefore recommend that con-
sideration be given to how incident reporting systems
can best be used to identify risks of the type identified
here. Other high-risk incidents, such as those relating
to concentrated potassium chloride, could also be
studied in this way. At present, requests for data can
be made to NHS England, the body responsible for
commissioning healthcare for people living in
England. Such requests are currently granted to bona
fide organisations on a case-by-case basis. However,
making properly anonymised incident report data
more readily available to researchers, professional
bodies, clinicians and patient representatives would
provide further opportunities for learning.
We have also identified specific risks which appear
to remain, concerning the separation of intravenous
and intrathecal chemotherapy in time and space, and
highlighted some areas where further action may be
needed, such as in the area of intrathecal antibiotics.
Of concern is that some incident reports were
lacking detail and did not give a full account of the
nature of the hazard. Encouraging more comprehen-
sive narratives when reporting is as important, argu-
ably more so, than increasing reporting rates.
CONCLUSION
We identified 38 patient safety incidents relating to
vinca alkaloids and intrathecal medication reported
over a 10-year period. Problems most commonly
related to separating intravenous and intrathecal
chemotherapy in time or location. In the UK, to the
best of our knowledge, there have been no deaths or
serious incidents associated with the spinal injection
of vinca alkaloids in recent years. Yet, in other fields
of risk, such as aviation, the absence of an accident is
not an acceptable basis to conclude that a system is
safe. The deaths from maladministration of vincris-
tine, while dreadful, afforded the opportunity to learn
and improve. The challenge, across all areas of harm,
is now to create and use data on upstream low-harm
occurrences to test the resilience of safety practices
and systems. We here suggest how this may be done
using large incident report databases to study risks
related to rare but very serious adverse events.
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